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Abstract This paper critically examines the historical conceptualization of cogni-
tive behavioral psychotherapy approaches (CBT) as a direct clinical counterpart of 
the cognitive revolution. The main “second wave” cognitive psychotherapies, either 
standard cognitive therapy (CT) or constructivist, in spite of their differences, share 
a common conceptualization of psychopathological factors as superordinate struc-
tural cognitive content belonging to the self: self-beliefs, self-schemata, personal-
ity organizations and so on. On the other hand, rational emotive behavior therapy 
(REBT) is an exception given that in REBT self-knowledge is not the core psycho-
pathological tenet, being rather a derivate mechanism. Moreover, in non clinical 
cognitive science cognition is conceived as a regulatory function that operates ret-
roactively and not in a hierarchically super- ordered fashion centered on the self. A 
historical review suggests that in both CT and constructivist model the structural-
istic model of self-centered cognition may have emerged for both cultural and sci-
entific reasons: self-centered cognitive models may be more readily understandable 
to clinicians as they allow for a straightforward identification of operationalizable 
self-beliefs. The emergence of new “third wave” process-centered CBT approaches 
may represent a comeback to functionalism, where cognition is considered again a 
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regulatory function and not a structure. In addition, REBT’s interest in dysfunctional 
evaluations not focused on the self presaged this clinical and scientific turning point 
toward functionalism.
Keywords Cognitive therapies · Constructivism · Functionalism · Processes · Self-
belief · Structuralism
The Role of Self‑Knowledge in the Clinical Theory of Cognitive 
Therapies
The birth of cognitive behavioral psychotherapy (CBT) approaches has often been 
described as the clinical equivalent of the cognitive revolution which took place in 
the field of scientific psychology thanks to Chomsky (1959), Miller et  al. (1960), 
Newell et  al. (1958) and many others. The revolution consisted of the addition of 
a cognitive mediator interposed between environmental triggers and behavioral 
responses. This cognitive mediator would be organized in terms of self-schemata 
which play a structural role: self-schemata would provide guide, consistency, coor-
dination, and integration to mental states (Neisser 1967; Markus 1977).
Sometimes this revolution that led to CBT approaches is also called “second 
wave” since the cognitive mediator would have been absent in the “first wave” 
behavioral model (Hayes 2004). Ellis’ rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT; 
Ellis 1955, 1962; Ellis and Grieger 1986) and Beck’s cognitive therapy (CT; Beck 
1963, 1964, 1976; Beck et al. 1979) were the champions of the “second wave” being 
the first to propose clinical counterparts to the cognitive revolution. They were fol-
lowed by other, less famous theorists, including Lazarus (1976), Mahoney (1974, 
1991, 1995a, b, 2003), Meichenbaum (1977), Goldfried and Davison (1976) and 
many others. At a later time, “second wave” bifurcated into a “rationalist” approach 
which included both Beck’s CT and Ellis’ REBT and conceived cognition as a con-
scious computational knowledge and a “constructivist” approach which viewed 
cognition as a hermeneutical, emotionally laden, and “tacit” knowledge stemming 
from human relationships (Mahoney 1995b; Guidano and Liotti 1983). Finally, the 
so-called “third wave” would have happily concluded the story by integrating func-
tional processes in the overriding model of CBT approaches (Hayes and Hofman 
2018).
However, we argue for a different narrative of the development of CBT in which 
(1) at the beginning, cognitive science viewed cognition not as a structural media-
tor organized in terms of self-centered contents of knowledge but as functionalist 
retroactive processes which were already partially present in the behavioral “first 
wave” and foreran the “third wave” process centered models; (2) despite the sup-
posed divergences between “rationalist” and “constructivist” approaches of the “sec-
ond wave” both converged toward a structuralist conception of self-knowledge that 
had roots not only in cognitive science but also in some psychodynamic models; 
(3) within the “second wave” REBT is an exception given that it does not consider 
self-knowledge a structuralist psychopathological tenet; (4) “third wave” process 
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centered models retrieve the functionalist models of cognitive science and reject 
the structuralist self-psychology of the “second wave” and may be classified in 
top–down and bottom–up models, in relation to which functions they prefer to con-
fer the role of strategic bottleneck to be targeted in therapy. Figure 1 represents this 
differing narration. This paper aims to illustrate this view in detail.
The theoretical models of the cognitive revolution allowed for the abandonment 
the stimulus–response behavioral model and replaced it by using the so-called Test-
Operate-Test-Exit or TOTE model described by Miller et  al. (1960), which is the 
basic unit of cognitive functioning. The TOTE model proposes that in a cognitive 
behavioral sequence individuals plan a goal and perform a test (T) in order to deter-
mine whether the goal has been accomplished. When individuals do not accomplish 
the goal, they cognitively conceive and behaviorally perform operations (O) in order 
to achieve the goal. After that, individuals perform the test (T) again, and exit (E) 
occurs if the goal is achieved. Otherwise, the process repeats. For example, a per-
ception of threat and fear (T) generates an escape reaction (O) that continues to be 
used (T) until the disappearance of the threat.
When re-examing in depth the TOTE model, it is clear that cognitive function 
is not conceived as nowadays as a structural mediator schema interposed between 
trigger and response but more aptly as a feedback which controls and acts retroac-
tively performing operations (O) not on inert environmental triggers but on mental 
evaluative states not coincidentally called “test” (T), correcting and regulating them 
until the mind would accomplish the desired outcome called “exit” (E). Therefore, 
the O function does not work as a mediational cognitive operator but rather as a 
retroactive executive agent providing control feedbacks on mental states, a function 
which is more metacognitive than properly cognitive, being a second-order regula-
tion -within the mind itself- of mental states by mental processes and not a first-
order cognitive evaluation of an object to know (Wells and Mathews 2015, p. 31; 
Williams et al. 1988). In addition, in these early models, there was no mention of 
Ellis: REBT 
(1950s – present) 
- Recognition of the role 
played by conscious thought
- Recognition of the 
therapeutic role of rationality
- Central role of maladaptive 
evaluations: "shoulds" /
"demands"
Development of the Constructive branch of cognitive therapies: Mahoney, Guidano
(1970s - present)
- Cognition as a hermeneutical and proactive activity developed not only in conscious terms,
but also as “tacit” knowledge
- CBT standard models considered simplistic 
- Stressing the role of personal meanings
Cognitive Revolution
(1960s)
- Cognition as mediator 
interposed between 
environmental trigger and 
behavioral responses.
- TOTE model
Self schema cognitive theories in standard CBT and in constructive models
- Structural cognitive contents belonging to the self: self-knowledge, self-schemata, self-beliefs, and personality organizations
- Hierarchical organization of self related contents
- Content related cognitive variables 
- Less attention to functional processes
L tt ti
Beck: CT
(1970s – present)
- Cognitive biases, faulty thinking processes in 
which cognitive functions are used in a maladaptive 
way
- Development of replicable protocols applicable to 
DSM system of psychiatric diagnoses
- Randomized trial proving CT’s effectiveness for 
depression
“Third wave” of cognitive 
and behavioral therapies
(1990s – present)
- Emphasis on functional
processes
- Less attention to structural 
self related contents
CBT protocols
(1980s - present) 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (Salkovskis, 1985); 
Panic disorder (Clark, 1986); Social anxiety (Clark 
& Wells, 1995); Eating disorders (Fairburn et al., 
1999); Post-traumatic stress disorder (Elhers & 
Clark, 2000); Clinical efficacy of protocols proven 
in controlled studies (Clark et al., 1999; Hollon & 
Beck, 1994; Hollon et al.; 1996; Hollon et al., 2006; 
Otte, 2011)
Fig. 1  The development of cognitive therapies
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cognitive content focused on the typical self-belief and self-schemata of later mod-
els (for example as heralded in the “schema theory” postulated in mature “standard” 
cognitive psychotherapy).
However, it is apparent that over time in cognitive science emerged a “schema 
theory” focused on self-centered mental variables which play a mediating role. This 
phenomenon dates back to the publication of models by Neisser (1967) and espe-
cially by Markus (1977). Additionally, we cannot forget to quote the influence of 
Bandura’s model of self-efficacy (Bandura 1977, 1988). These models privileged 
the role of structural cognitive mediators organized in the form of knowledge of the 
self (self-knowledge), patterns of the self (self-schemata) and beliefs about the self 
(self-belief).
Cognitive self schemata would be stable and integrated organizations of knowl-
edge which would summarize an array of information and experience in friendly 
manageable packages (Markus and Sentis 1982). Among schemata, self-schemata 
would be hierarchically superordinate and unique in that they integrate and sum-
marize a person’s thoughts, feelings, and experiences. This means that any attempt 
to organize one’s own behavior in a particular domain would always result in the 
formation of cognitive structures about the self. Self-schemata are established in 
domains that the person values, including physical characteristics, social roles, per-
sonality traits, and areas of particular interest and skill (Markus and Nurius 1986).
However, in the clinical field of CBT, the preference for self-schemata and self-
knowledge was not a later development but prevailed from the beginning. This 
different evolution highlights a real difference in historical development between 
cognitive science and CBT approaches. Hollon and DiGiuseppe (2010), in their 
exhaustive historical account, have confirmed that the cognitive revolution in cogni-
tive psychology and CBT did not appear to effect each other.
Beck’s CT model explained emotional disorders using cognitive biases, faulty 
thinking processes in which cognitive functions are used in a maladaptive way. In 
turn, cognitive biases were packed into conscious negative schemata focused on the 
self, the world/environment and the future (CT’s cognitive triad). Over time, self-
schemata won a prevailing role within the cognitive triad of CT (Wells and Mathews 
1994, p. 2). As mentioned earlier, this final prevalence of self-schemata theory is 
also attributable to the influence of the clinical applications of Bandura’s seminal 
work on self-efficacy (Maddux and Kleiman 2012). Summing up, mature cognitive 
models elevate self-judgment to foundational levels in explaining emotional stabil-
ity. Positive self-judgments about being able to manage and control events and their 
own emotional reactions are seen as largely responsible for their emotional well-
being and daily life efficacy. Negative self-judgments are what make them depressed 
or anxious (Williams 1996).
Psychodynamic Influence on Self‑Knowledge
However, it is possible that Beck’s CT switch from cognitive biases to negative self-
schemata depended not only on the parallel switch operated by Bandura, Neisser, 
and Markus in cognitive science, but also by Beck’s psychotherapeutic background. 
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Initially, Beck had psychodynamic training in the field of American ego-psychology 
developed by Anna Freud (1936/1966) and Hartmann and Loewenstein (Hartmann 
1964; Hartmann and Loewenstein 1964). In this psychodynamic paradigm, it was 
supposed that the human mind owns ego functions can be either the result of adap-
tive and normal development of mental capacities or may be influenced by con-
flicted aggressive and libidinal impulses (Rosner 2014a, b). In short, the ego plays a 
key organizational role in mental activity in ego-psychology, both in normality and 
in psychopathological states which seems similar to the structural role played by the 
self in the cognitive clinical psychology inspired by Beck.
Beck was trained at the Philadelphia Institute of the American Psychoanalitic 
Association. Rosner (2014a, b) recounts that he abruptly switched to the cognitive 
paradigm at some point in the 1960s during his research activity, after he failed to 
confirm the psychodynamic hypothesis of depression as an outcome of anger and 
aggression drives. Beck’s clinical development, however, appears more uneven. It 
is true that after his first doubts about the psychoanalytic model, Beck began study-
ing the clinical and theoretical works of Ellis, Lazarus, Mahoney, and Davidson, 
pioneers of the cognitive clinical switch. Yet at the same time Beck continued to 
partially consider himself a follower of ego-psychology, the neo-Freudian psycho-
analytic current which favored conscious ego functions at the expense of the uncon-
scious ego and id (Rosner 2014a, b). And in fact, even as late as 1970, Beck pub-
lished an article on the cognitive triad in a psychoanalytic journal (Beck 1970a) and 
described his model as an integration between neo-Freudian and behaviorist con-
cepts, in which the cognitive triad of CT played a mediational role between trigger 
and behavioral response (Beck 1970b). In those same years, Beck explored the role 
of fantasies and dreams in psychology (Beck 1970c, 1971).
Self‑Knowledge in REBT: Not so Core an Irrational Belief
Like Beck, Ellis had strong psychodynamically oriented training, specifically with 
Karen Horney at the American Institute of Psychoanalysis in New York in the late 
1950s (Ellis 1962). Ellis, however, divorced himself from his psychodynamic back-
ground in a more rapid and seemingly painless way than Beck. Perhaps this allowed 
him to be less influenced by self-knowledge related concepts. In Ellis’ REBT model, 
emotional distress depends on maladaptive evaluations called “irrational beliefs” 
which share much less Beck’s CT focusing less on the self and self-knowledge. This 
is an important difference between REBT and all other cognitive therapies (Ellis 
1962; Ellis and Grieger 1986).
In its most recent formulations, REBT focuses on four types of irrational beliefs: 
“demandingness”, “awfulizing”, “frustration intolerance”, and “self/other worth rat-
ings” (DiGiuseppe et  al. 2014, pp. 34–36). Among these beliefs, self/other worth 
ratings is probably closest to a self-knowledge structure. However, the role of self/
other rating in REBT is different from the mechanism played by self-beliefs in either 
Beck’s CT or other CBT models for various reasons. First, self/other worth ratings 
is not the pivotal mechanism in the psychopathological model of REBT. In REBT 
the core role is played by demandigness, while the other three mechanisms could not 
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work if not triggered by demandingness and are therefore called derivative irrational 
beliefs (DiGiuseppe et al. 2014, pp. 36–39). Second, self/other worth ratings are not 
related only to the self. Other people can be the object of the evaluations as well as 
the self. Third, while CT’s biases encompass the whole chain of cognitive inference 
triggered by initial automatic thoughts, REBT’s irrational beliefs are restricted to 
the final, most upsetting, evaluative step. In Beck’s CT model, the chain of negative 
inference starts from the initial automatic thought (e.g., “this performance is dif-
ficult”), evolves in subsequent assumptions (e.g., “if it is difficult, I may fail”), and 
ends in negative self-beliefs (e.g., “I am a failure”). REBT focuses on an evaluative 
step which comes after the chain of inferences. The evaluation makes the final result 
irrational. For example, in case of awfulizing (“if I fail it’s awful”) the irrational step 
that creates the emotional disorder is the final awfulizing evaluation: “if I fail it’s 
awful,” and not the preceding chain of negative thoughts, “if I fail.” Failure is a pos-
sible scenario in our daily life: who can take success for granted?
This difference between CT and REBT is very telling when applied to “self/
other worth ratings” where the psychopathological problem is actually not related 
to the specific content of a self-belief. Many beliefs about the self will be neither 
wrong nor irrational, given that a person may be actually perform poorly or lack 
skills or abilities. But the additional global evaluation of his or her worth as a person 
will always be irrational, for there is no agreed upon standard or science or logic to 
human rating. In fact, in REBT “self/other worth ratings” is not replaced by empiri-
cally based positive self-ratings but by the functional “unconditional self accept-
ance” (USA) in which self worth is not related to performances and self-judgments 
but it is recognized as an intrinsic attribute of human dignity (DiGiuseppe et  al. 
2014, pp. 50–54).
Summing up, in REBT, emotional disorders do not depend on a structurally 
biased self knowledge but on functionally maladaptive evaluations which are only 
partially related to self knowledge. This suggests that REBT is not only the first ver-
sion of “second wave” cognitive therapy but also a forerunner of the emerging, func-
tionalistic “third wave” switch in clinical cognitive paradigm.
Self‑Knowledge in Beck’s CT as a Core Belief
It might also be true that concept of self-knowledge helped Beck to formalize his 
procedures in amenable ways for clinicians, who perhaps found self-beliefs more 
understandable and manageable than abstract cognitive biases. Moreover, Beck’s 
crucial advantage was his allegiance to the development of replicable protocols 
applicable to the DSM system of psychiatric diagnoses. This strategy allowed Beck 
to perform the first true randomized trial that proved CT’s effectiveness for the treat-
ment of depression (Rush et al. 1977).
A final breakthrough came with application of the Beck’s CT model to anxiety 
disorders, grounded in research from the University of Oxford led by Clark and 
Salkovskis. They worked out a series of cognitive therapy protocols modelled on the 
work of Beck and applied to a wide range of psychological disorders: panic disorder 
(Clark 1986), social phobia (Clark and Wells 1995), post-traumatic stress disorder 
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(Ehlers and Clark 2000), eating disorders (Fairburn et al. 1999) and obsessive–com-
pulsive disorder (Salkovskis 1985). Importantly, the clinical efficacy of these pro-
tocols was demonstrated in controlled studies (Clark et al. 1999; Hollon and Beck 
1994; Hollon et al. 1996, 2006; Nathan and Gorman 2015; Otte 2011).
The British academics borrowed from Beck both his “psychodynamic” care for 
verbal reattribution focused on self-beliefs and his “psychiatric” attention for DSM 
diagnoses (Rachman 2015). However, they strongly reintroduced the behavioral ele-
ment which has historically been central in the British landscape, based on the work 
of Victor Meyer in the days of the Protocol for Exposure and Response Prevention 
(ERP) for obsessive compulsive disorder (Meyer 1966). British behaviorism was 
more likely to provide a suitable candidate for merging with Beck’s CT because of 
Meyer’s efforts in developing appropriate case formulation procedures (Bruch 2015; 
Marks 2012; Rachman 2015). Beck also expanded the range of applications and 
increased behavioral components in his model (Beck et al. 1979, 1985).
Thus, a standard clinical model was born, called CT in the USA and CBT in the 
UK (not to be confused with the use of the term “CBT approaches” to indicate the 
total set of all cognitive behavioral therapies). The standard model had the funda-
mental tenets that emotional disorders depend on biased automatic cognitive pro-
cesses which can be changed through verbal reattribution in therapy (Beck 1976; 
Clark et al. 1999; Clark and Beck 2010; Dobson and Dozois 2010; Ellis and Grieger 
1986; Goldberg 2001; Kazdin 1978; Kelly 1955; Mahoney 1974; Meichenbaum 
1977; Rachman 1977).
Self‑Knowledge in Constructive Cognitive Therapies
Although it is not true that Beck and Ellis are the only theorists to deserve praise 
for the development of the basic clinical model of CBT approaches, it is true that 
today they receive much more attention than the likes of Lazarus, Mahoney, and 
Meichenbaum.
In the past the scenario was different. In addition to Beck’s CT and Ellis’ REBT 
the range of CBT approaches also included Covert Sensitization (Cautela 1967), 
Problem-solving and Behavior Modification (D’Zurilla and Goldfried 1971), 
Multi-Modal Behavior Therapy (Lazarus 1976), Cognitive Behavior Modification 
(Meichenbaum 1977), Clinical Behavior Therapy (Goldfried and Davison 1976), 
Systematic Rational Restructuring (Goldfried et al. 1974), Post-rationalist Cognitive 
Therapy (Guidano 1991), Constructive Therapy (Mahoney 2003) and others.
Summing up, in the decade 1971–1980 the clinical models of these scholars 
occupied the scene with authoritativeness equal to Ellis’ REBT and Beck’s CT, as 
also suggested by the number of Google citations. Table 1 reports the results of a 
Google Scholar citation search in which we entered the terms “Albert Ellis”, “Aaron 
Beck”, “Arnold Lazarus”, “Donald Meichenbaum”, “Michael J. Majoney”, “Marvin 
Goldfried”, “Vittorio Guidano”, “Gerald Davison”, “J.R. Cautela”, and “Thomas 
D’Zurilla” for each reported decade from 1951 on. The table shows how in the 
decade 1971–1980 the influence of Lazarus, Mahoney, and Meichenbaum was still 
comparable to that of Beck (while Albert Ellis seems to play in another league), at 
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least in terms of Google Scholar citations. The scene changes from 1981 onward: 
Beck’s influence became closer to that of Ellis while the others were left behind 
(Table 1). 
Among them, the preeminent figures were Lazarus (1976), Mahoney (2003), and 
Meichenbaum (1977). While Meichenbaum applied his model mainly to social and 
community psychology, Lazarus and Mahoney were the scholars who devoted their 
major theoretical efforts to the development of a clinical model comparable to Ellis’ 
and Beck’s (Dobson and Dozois 2010). Unlike Beck and Ellis, however, Lazarus 
and Mahoney were not trained psychodynamically. From a certain viewpoint, they 
were the authentic clinical counterparts of the non-clinical theorists of the cognitive 
revolution; those who, coming from a behaviorist background, applied the cognitive 
revolution in the clinical field and promoted CBT approaches. Lazarus and Mahoney 
were also the scholars who, during the 1970s, diverged from their original behav-
iorism and imagined that it was possible to design therapeutic procedures focused 
on mental content and not on the behavioral trigger-response. A similar theoretical 
effort was dealt with by Goldfried (1971) who described systematic desensitization 
in terms of a general mediational model, in contrast to Wolpe’s (1958) countercondi-
tioning model. Moreover, Mahoney was the person who actually favored the general 
acceptance of the term “cognitive” by establishing in 1977 the eponimous journal 
“Cognitive Therapy and Research” with himself as inaugural editor (Dobson and 
Dozois 2010).
Basically, Lazarus and Mahoney were unsatisfied with the behavioral techniques 
and felt it was necessary to introduce into the behavioral model a cognitive media-
tor on which it would possibly verbally intervene via the conscious channel. It is 
Table 1  Google Scholar citations of major clinical theorists of cognitive behavioral therapy
1951–1960 1961–1970 1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2010 2011–2018
Albert Ellis 328 610 1060 1300 1890 4500 5290
Aaron Beck 25 33 209 399 915 3020 4650
Arnold 
Lazarus
23 164 262 272 349 585 617
Donald 
Meichen-
baum
– 14 153 201 296 470 609
Michael J. 
Majoney
– 7 192 156 190 219 135
Marvin 
Goldfried
3 32 86 90 142 215 186
Vittorio 
Guidano
– – 7 19 71 239 283
Gerald 
Davison
– 35 77 47 84 115 73
J.R. Cau-
tela
7 54 108 78 69 75 38
Thomas 
D’Zurilla
– 7 13 16 28 49 30
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no secret that the channel of conscious thought was devalued not only by psychoa-
nalysis, but also by behaviorism. Not only psychoanalysis, but also behaviorism con-
ceived mental suffering as a dysfunctional state learned in a state of unconscious-
ness, either through unconscious drives or non-conscious, behavioral conditioning. 
The mind was reduced to a zombie driven by unconscious forces (Liotti and Reda 
1981). Lazarus and Mahoney seemed to feel a need for a more psychological model 
of mental suffering, which would recognize the role played by conscious thought 
(Lazarus 1977; Mahoney 1984, 1991). But before Ellis and Beck there was a singu-
lar blindness in the theoretical perspective of behavior therapists to the patient’s psy-
chological life, whose emotions and experiences might never be directly addressed 
in the session. At least, this was the theoretical perspective. On the other hand, an 
anecdotal communication by an expert behavior therapist who practiced in those 
days tells a different story: thoughts were investigated calling them rule governed 
behaviors (Mosticoni 2018).
However it is also true that Mahoney retained from behaviorism the awareness 
that cognitive processes cannot be reduced to their conscious representations in 
terms of internal dialogue, as Beck and Ellis did. Mahoney considered this develop-
ment an oversimplification and posed the need for a more sophisticated definition 
of cognition at the ground of the notorious and self-defeating distinction between a 
“rationalist” and a “constructivist” approach (Mahoney 1995b, p. 7). The rationalist 
approach viewed cognition as a direct appraisal of reality immediately accessible to 
consciousness. The constructivist approach conceived of cognition as a hermeneuti-
cal and proactive activity developing not only in conscious terms but also in terms 
of “tacit” knowledge (Mahoney 1995b; Guidano and Liotti 1983; Guidano 1987, 
1991).
Mahoney’s theoretical development toward constructivism was encouraged by 
his encounter with other constructivist theorists during a sabbatical mainly spent in 
Europe at the end of the 1970s. In particular he started cooperating with Vittorio 
Guidano and encouraged his publications (Guidano and Liotti 1983; Guidano 1987, 
1991). In addition to the front-runners Guidano and Mahoney, many other authors 
contributed to development of the constructivist branch of cognitive therapies 
(Balbi 2004; Feixas and Miró 1993; Guidano and Liotti 1983; Guidano 1987, 1991; 
Guidano and Quiñones 2001; Lorenzini and Sassaroli 1995; Mahoney 1974, 1991, 
1995a, b, 2003; Muran and Safran 1993; Neimeyer 2009; Neimeyer and Mahoney 
1995; Winter and Viney 2005). From a clinical viewpoint, constructive therapists 
preferred interventions focused on personal meanings, including reconstruction of 
the patients’ life stories and treatment of recursive vicious circles of discomfort with 
emotion and fear of fear. This intervention anticipated metacognitive concepts, in a 
way akin to REBT’s concept of secondary ABC (Sassaroli et al. 2005).
In the long run, constructivism indulged in highly speculative thinking which 
risked not addressing empirical challenges. This propensity for speculation fell 
under the influence of Maturana and Varela (1980) and von Glaserfeld (1995), went 
hermeneutic and radically constructivist, and rejected the development of the rep-
licable “constructivist” treatment protocols and case formulation procedures based 
on DSM diagnoses that were standard features of Beck’s CT and arguably its major 
strength (Guidano 1991; Mahoney 2003; Neimeyer 2009).
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However, at the beginning of the 1980s, theoretical sophistication gave a tem-
porary prevalence to the constructivist branch, given that even Beck and Ellis pro-
claimed themselves constructive therapists for a while (Mahoney 1995b, pp. 6–10). 
The constructivist branch considered the Beckian style of verbal assessment and 
reattribution of beliefs to be simplistic and CT was viewed as affected by a form of 
crude computationalism inapplicable to the complex fluidity of mental reality. Con-
structive therapists preferred to talk about personal meanings, referring to Bruner 
(1973) and, to a lesser extent, to Kelly (1955). Unlike beliefs, personal meanings 
would be more closely tied to the personal life history of the patient and to his or her 
emotional experiences. Personal meanings were not a single set of beliefs about a 
situation, but a vision of the self and the world (Mahoney, 1995b, pp. 11–13).
From Self‑Knowledge to the Therapeutic Relationship
Despite all the possible theoretical differences between “rationalist” and the “con-
structivist” therapies, it must noted that constructivist therapies also conceived 
of self-knowledge and self-schemata as having a super- ordinate structure that 
explained both healthy and psychopathological states. This is true not only for 
Mahoney and Guidano, but also of Kelly’s personal construct therapy, as developed 
by his epigones (Neimeyer and Mahoney 1995; Winter and Viney 2005; Neimeyer 
2009). Moreover, “rationalist” and “constructivist” approaches converged toward a 
structuralist conception of self-knowledge and self-schemata that developed into a 
sort of nosography of personality in both opposing camps. In 1993, DiGiuseppe and 
Linscott have provided evidence indicating that rationalism and constructivism are 
not bipolar philosophies and there is no evidence that these philosophical difference 
reflect actual differences in they way therapists conduct therapy. It is remarkable that 
even within the Beckian CT tradition—especially with Judith Beck’s compendium 
works (1995, 2005)—we can observe the emergence of a classification table of self-
beliefs that ends resembling the constructivist architecture of personality organiza-
tions outlined by Guidano and Liotti (1983) and confirmed by Mahoney (Mahoney 
et  al. 1995; Mahoney 2003). It is plausible that the emphasis—increasing over 
time—on self-beliefs and self-schemata within CT may have been influenced by the 
attention paid to the concept of personality organization in the constructivist branch 
of the cognitive therapies (see Table 2).
In turn, growing attention to self-knowledge and self-schemata may have 
depended upon an increasing ‘contamination’ of theoretical backgrounds rooted in 
both the psychodynamic and humanistic fields. Many clinical and non-clinical theo-
rists have developed models in which the self plays a structural role in organizing, 
coordinating, and regulating the other psychological functions. The self provides 
consistency, continuity, and identity in the individual development; it is not the 
result of memory and information but is the guarantee of good psychological func-
tioning. Albeit with some differences depending on their approach, we could men-
tion not only Erikson (1950), Kohut (1977), and Rogers (1977), but also Bandura 
(1977) as examples of a trans-theoretical emergence of the self as organizing struc-
ture around which individuals may build their psychological wellbeing. Of course, 
1 3
A Historical and Theoretical Review of Cognitive Behavioral…
Bandura’s self-efficacy and Erikson’s self-identity show many different features. 
However, it cannot be denied that, from the 1970s onwards, the self was a land-
ing place where scholars with backgrounds as different as Bandura, Erikson, Kohut, 
and Rogers, found a meeting spot in which their theoretical distances significantly 
decreased. The self was a good alternative to the lost explicative power of concepts 
like Freudian drive or Beckian beliefs.
In turn, it should be stressed that the parallel movement went on even after the 
discovery of the self in these theories. In fact, the prevalence of the self ended up 
generating an increasing attention towards the therapeutic relationship in many ther-
apeutic approaches. From the 1980s on, the theoretical development of most thera-
peutic approaches saw the appearance of models focused on the analysis of interper-
sonal patterns in the direct experience and management of the therapeutic session. 
This evolution is observable in both standard CBT (JS Beck 2005, pp. 15–16; Hof-
mann et al. 2013; Leahy 2008, 2015) and in the constructivist therapy (Dimaggio 
et al. 2007; Hermans and Dimaggio 2004; Mahoney 2003; Neimeyer 2009).
A similar movement was even more pronounced in the humanistic and the psy-
choanalytic fields, which were, historically, already interested in relational aspects. 
Rogers had paid attention to the relationship from the beginning of his development 
of Client Centered therapy (Rogers 1959) while in psychodynamic theory the inter-
est showed a further step ahead when the so-called relational paradigm (Mitchell 
2000) emerged. Summing up, we may consider this centrality of the therapeutic 
relationship to be the natural development of a theoretical conception that offers a 
key-role to self-structures.
Table 2  Self-beliefs in cognitive behavioral therapy and in constructive models
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Self beliefs (adapted 
from Beck 2011, p. 233)
Constructive personality organizations (Guidano 
and Liotti 1983, pp. 171–306; Mahoney et al. 
1995; Mahoney 2003)
Helpless self
Defective; Failed; Helpless; Incompetent; Inef-
fective; Loser; Needy; Not good enough; Out of 
control; Powerless; Trapped; Victim; Vulnerable; 
Weak
Phobic personality organization
Being despised; Being ridiculed; Needing protec-
tion; Not amiable; Not in control; Unable to 
cope with; Weak
Unlovable self
Bad; Bound to be abandoned; Bound to be alone; 
Bound to be rejected; Defective; Different; Unat-
tractive; Uncared for; Undesirable; Unlikeable; 
Unlovable; Unwanted
Depressed personality organization
Abandoned; Being wrong; Disappointed; Failed; 
Helpless; Isolated; Missing significant ones 
(loss); Needing approval; Not loved; Rejected; 
Separated; Worthless
Worthless self
A waste; Dangerous; Don’t deserve to live; Evil; 
Immoral; Toxic; Unacceptable; Worthless
Obsessive personality organization
Controlled; Detached; Doubtful; Guilty; Judgmen-
tal; Looking for certainty; Moral; Perfectionis-
tic; Responsible; Restrained; Unemotional
Eating disordered personality organization
Adhering to other ones’ judgment; Craving for 
emotional contact; Dependent; Self-criticizing; 
Self-deprecating; Undefined
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Back to Functionalism?
In contrast with the convergence toward structuralism and self-schemata of both 
CT and constructivist therapies, it would also be possible to interpret the so-called 
“third wave” clinical models as a back-to-functionalism theoretical movement 
and an anti-structuralist reaction (Hayes and Strosahl 2004; Martell et al. 2001; 
Kanter et  al. 2009; McCullough 2003; Linehan 1993; Kohlenberg et  al. 1993; 
Christensen et  al. 1995). “Third wave” CBT approaches are characterized by a 
heterogeneous array of themes: acceptance, experiential intervention, cognitive 
fusion, commitment, compassion, developmental aspects, dialectics, emotions, 
metacognition, meditation, mindfulness, while more broadly it also involves 
interpersonal themes, therapeutic relationship, and spirituality (Kahl et al. 2012). 
In these models, the importance attributed to self-knowledge and self-schemata is 
sharply reduced, while the therapeutic process focuses on either top down mental 
functions such as voluntary attention and executive control governed by metacog-
nitive procedures or on bottom–up experiential and interpersonal processes. The 
role played by these mental functions may be an indicative criterion for under-
standing the new directions taken by these models with respect to early CT and 
constructivist models.
In Beck’s CT and in constructivist models voluntary attention and executive con-
trol depend on the elaboration of cognitive contents related to self-knowledge and 
self concepts. These models hypothesize that the therapeutic mechanism depends on 
so-called “first-order change” that is change by direct exploration and modification 
of cognitive evaluations of external reality without any second level action on inter-
nal meta-cognition, e.g. beliefs over emotions, behaviors and even over other beliefs 
(Lyddon 1990; Wells and Mathews 1994, p. 2). However, this is exactly the place 
where theoretical doubts about “second wave” models have focused their criticisms. 
Empirical research, despite having found correlations between cognitive changes 
and decreased emotional distress (Burns and Spangler 2001; Morgenstern and Long-
abaugh 2000), has failed to conclusively prove that the effectiveness of either Beck’s 
CT or other CBT approaches -including constructivist models- depended on a “first-
order change” (Dobson and Khatri 2000, p. 913; Hayes 2004; Illardi and Craighead 
1994; Jacobson et al. 1996). There was a lack of evidence about the supposed direct 
relationship between the mental representations of self-knowledge and the architec-
ture of emotional and behavioral dysfunctional processes (Mathews and Wells 1999, 
p. 180; Rosenfarb and Hayes 1984). It is no coincidence that in 1996 Beck, himself 
-in paradoxical concurrence with the mundane success of his CT model- published a 
paper entitled “Beyond belief” (Beck 1996).
The new, “third-wave” models propose that emotional disorders do not depend 
on mental representations of the self (again, self-knowledge and self-beliefs) as 
Beck thought (Beck 1976), but on dysfunctional regulation of the interaction 
between voluntary processes—first of all attention and executive control- and 
automatic, and emotionally-laden associative processes (Kahneman and Frederick 
2002; Martin and Sloman 2013; Sloman 1996, 2002; Stanovich 1999; Stanovich 
and West 2002; Wells and Mathews 1994).
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Actually, these processes are not rigidly separated but influence each other in 
many directions which can roughly be reduced to a bottom–up direction, from 
the sensory-motor level perceived as emotions (bottom) to voluntary proposi-
tional cognitive and metacognitive representations (up), and vice versa, that is 
top–down. In turn, this bi-directional reductionist model may be also useful in 
order to map therapeutic interventions: bottom–up interventions that aim to regu-
late the emotional and cognitive processes through experiential exposure, experi-
ential re-education, guided-imagery, or role playing (Bell et al. 2015; Hackmann 
et al. 2011); and top–down interventions aiming at acting at a verbal, declarative, 
and re-attributional level. Top–down interventions are, however, implemented 
mostly at a second-order metacognitive level in which mental states are regulated 
by attention, but not fully controlled by rational reasoning (Wells and Mathews 
1994; Williams et al. 1988). Figure 2 visually represents this map.
The detail that top–down interventions operate at a metacognitive level in 
which mental states regulates other mental states and not at a direct cognitive 
level in which beliefs evaluates external reality helps us remember that pro-
cessing interventions are complex and not reproduce the simplistic opposition 
between rationalism and constructivism: in each of them, next to the bottom–up 
experiential component, there is always a top–down verbal reattribution compo-
nent, and vice versa. Moreover, some models show an additional interpersonal 
component focused on the therapeutic relationship and on the assessment of the 
personal life history of the patient. We may classify the new models in different 
groups in terms of proclivity towards one or the other poles of attentional con-
trollability: from high levels of metacognitive controllability to less controllable 
Emotional disorders depending on “processes”: emotional 
regulation and metacognitive biases
The processes would influence each other: from the experiential  
and emotional level (bottom) to propositional cognitive and 
metacognitive representations (up), and vice versa
Processual models tend to explain emotional disorders in terms of 
incorrect use of a function: emotional regulation in bottom-up 
experiential models and attention in top-down meta-cognitive
models
Experiential and emotional regulation
Aiming to regulate the emotional and cognitive processes through 
emotional validation, experiential exposure, experiential re-education, 
guided-imagery, role playing, self-disclosure and so on, and vice versa, 
h i d
- Schema Therapy (ST, Arntz & van Genderen, 2009; Young, Klosko, & 
Weishaar, 2003)
- Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT, Dimaggio, Montano, 
Popolo, & Salvatore, 2015; Semerari, Carcione, Dimaggio, Nicolò, & 
Procacci, 2007; Semerari et al., 2014)
Meta-cognitive regulation
- Acting at a verbal, declarative, and reattributional level
- Acting at a metacognitive level in which mental states are   
regulated by attention but not fully controlled by rational 
reasoning
- Meta-beliefs about mental states are the central mechanism of 
psychopathology - Repetitive Negative Thinking (RNT)
- Metacognitive Therapy (MCT, Wells, 2008)
- Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT, Kabat-Zinn, 2003;  
Ludwig & Kabat-Zinn, 2008)
Balanced models
- Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT, Hayes, & Strosahl, 2004) 
- Behavioral Activation (BA, Martell, Addis, & Jacobson, 2001; Kanter, 
Bush, & Rush, 2009)
- Cognitive Behavioral Analysis System of Psychotherapy (CBASP; 
McCullough, 2003)
- Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT, Linehan, 1993)
- Functional Analysis Psychotherapy (FAP, Kohlenberg et al. 1993)
- Integrative Behavioral Couples Therapy (IBCT, Christensen, Jacobson, 
& Babcock, 1995).)
Fig. 2  Process oriented therapies: a possible classification
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levels of experiential change. Some models appear as balanced while others are 
very prone to privilege one of the poles.
Balanced Models: “Third Wave” Therapies
A first group are the therapies strictly belonging to the “third wave”: Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT, Hayes and Strosahl 2004), Behavioral Activation (BA, 
Martell et  al. 2001; Kanter et  al. 2009), Cognitive Behavioral Analysis System of 
Psychotherapy (CBASP; McCullough 2003), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT, 
Linehan 1993), Functional Analysis Psychotherapy (FAP, Kohlenberg et al. 1993), 
and Integrative Behavioral Couples Therapy (IBCT, Christensen et al. 1995). Basi-
cally, these models have maintained a strong relationship with the behavioral tradi-
tion and represent a return to contextualism and functional analysis (Jacobson et al. 
2001). However, while traditional behavioral therapies focused heavily on change, 
“third wave” approaches attempt to integrate the twin goals of acceptance and 
change as positive outcomes. They encourage both the development of mental flex-
ibility in managing either adverse situations or emotional discomfort and the promo-
tion of a larger behavioral repertoire in daily life. Among these approaches, ACT 
is the most popular. Its main focus is to achieve a mental state of both accepting 
flexibility and commitment to personal values. In addition, ACT frequently shows 
a sophisticated experiential component that resembles an updated form of behav-
iorist extinction, but includes a more expanded degree of metacognitive awareness 
(Hayes et al. 2013). Similar considerations can also be made for CBASP and FAP, 
which also pursue behavioral flexibility. In general, all “third wave” approaches rec-
ommend flexibility in balancing acceptance of symptoms and change; these are, in 
turn, grounded on the Skinnerian distinction between contingency-shaped and rule-
governed behavior (Skinner 1966, 1969).
Summing up, flexibility, acceptance and commitment to change in third wave 
therapies should be not confused—despite the similarity—with any self-knowledge 
related concept. In fact, these models conceive flexibility as action related and rule 
governed behaviors and not as an internal knowledge about the self (Cordova and 
Eldridge 2000; Hayes and Strosahl 2004; Hayes et al. 2013). In terms of either top 
down or bottom up processes, “third wave” models have a balanced approach given 
that they both encourage a higher top down flexible increase of the function of con-
scious executive control, although essentially in terms of acceptance and commit-
ment to change; however, “third wave” models also consider essential the experi-
ential bottom up path, given that any conscious increased degree of flexibility is 
conceived as grounded in a experiential reinforcing context of reinforcing behavioral 
improvements.
Top–Down Models: Metacognition and Mindfulness
While core “third wave” therapies are balanced, prevalently top–down interventions 
assign an active role to the explicit mental representation and willing control—albeit 
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metacognitive—of processes. The metacognitive biases are not distorted patterns 
of reality evaluation in Beckian CT style but beliefs on the mental activity itself, 
i.e. dysfunctional meta-representations. Admittedly, the importance of metacogni-
tive components had already been intuited by Beck himself when he described the 
vicious circles of fear of fear (Beck et al. 1985) or even more sharply by Ellis with 
his seminal concept of secondary ABC (DiGiuseppe et al. 2014, pp. 64–65). Moreo-
ver, even constructivist approaches conceptualized the secondary ABC as an inter-
vention that foreran metacognitive concepts (Sassaroli et al. 2005). All in all, it is 
not coincidental that Windy Dryden called the secondary ABC a ‘meta- emotional 
problem’ (2011, p. 70), a name emphasizing its affinities with metacognitive mod-
els. In fact, the secondary problem is a biased irrational belief that patients have 
towards their mental states. Such a development is also observed in the CBT field 
with Leahy’s Emotional Schema Therapy (EST, Leahy 2015), a therapeutic model 
that, while not denying Beck’s CT filiation, focuses on meta-emotional schemata, 
namely beliefs about emotions as major pathological mechanisms and therapeutic 
targets: A brilliant way to move from a structuralist self-schema model to a more 
updated process oriented functionalism.
However, the new development is that, in the metacognitive models, it is firmly 
held that metacognitive beliefs about mental states are not only possible psycho-
pathological biases among others, but are the central mechanism of psychopathol-
ogy and the core theoretical principle (Mathews and Wells 1999, 2004; Wells and 
Mathews 1994; Wells 2008, 2013). These dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs are 
activated when the person in distress reacts to emotional discomfort—transforming 
it in an emotional disorder—by activating repetitive cycles of so-called Repetitive 
Negative Thinking (RNT) that feed on themselves for two main reasons: they are 
mistakenly conceived as functional plans for coping with reality and its problems 
(Gross 2002; Hayes and Feldman 2004; Salovey et al. 2000; Segerstrom et al. 2003; 
Wells 2008) and/or are deemed as an uncontrollable state stronger than personal 
executive willingness (Mathews and Wells 1999, 2004; Wells 2008, 2013; Wells and 
Mathews 1994; Williams et al. 1988).
There are several different treatment protocols which give importance to meta-
cognitive factors: MetaCognitive Therapy (MCT, Wells 2008, 2013), some compo-
nents of the above mentioned ACT (Hayes and Strosahl 2004) and many mindful-
ness-based interventions, among which the most developed is Mindfulness Based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT, Kabat-Zinn 2003; Ludwig and Kabat-Zinn 2008). 
All these models emphasize the possibility of managing dysfunctional processes 
through training aimed to distance oneself from painful and worrying mental states, 
albeit it is well known that any mindfulness practice also recommend to pay atten-
tion to the bottom up aspect of mental states.
Among all these approaches MCT more than any other considers metacognitive 
function as the center of psychopathology and ignores any hint to self schemata, 
self concepts, and self structures. In MCT metacognition is neither a structure nor 
a frame that holds everything together. Were metacognition a structure, we would 
return to a self-psychology, albeit reformulated in metacognitive terms: a meta-self 
psychology! Metacognition is rather a function that performs certain tasks in certain 
moments of mental life and that is always at risk of being used in dysfunctional 
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and anti-economic ways, hence generating emotional disorders (Wells 2008, 2013). 
MCT works using a specific case formulation and therapeutic project treating meta-
cognitive dysfunctions that had previously dysregulated patients’ attention and hin-
dered the development of his or her environmental adaption. Summing up, atten-
tion and metacognition are the functions on which MCT specifically acts (Wells and 
Mathews 1994, pp. 20–23).
Bottom–Up Models: Emotions, Experiences and Residual 
Self‑Knowledge
Among prevalently bottom–up models we can list two therapeutic protocols which 
integrate experiential interventions and process oriented, developmental and inter-
personal components and preserve a clinical and theoretical interest in self-knowl-
edge structures. Actually, their residual interest in self-knowledge is not coinciden-
tal given that the two models are later developments of the early standard cognitive 
and constructivist models respectively. They are Schema Therapy (ST, Arntz and 
van Genderen 2009; Young et al. 2003), a model primarily developed from a CBT 
clinical and theoretical background, and Metacognitive and Intepersonal Therapy 
(MIT, Dimaggio et al. 2015; Dimaggio et al. 2007; Semerari et al. 2007; Semerari 
et al. 2014) which can be considered a development of the constructivist model of 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) and Mahoney (2003). Also above mentioned Leahy’s 
EST could be included in this group.
ST preserves a strong interest in self-knowledge. In fact -as its name says- ST 
conceptualize emotional disorders in terms of biased self-schemata which however 
are not only purely cognitive as in Beck’s CT but also shows a strong emotional 
and interpersonal aspect rooted in the personal development of the patient (simi-
lar developments as also present in Leahy’s EST). These interpersonal features are 
represented in so-called “modes” which are stereotyped and inflexible interpersonal 
patterns. However, there is also a metacognitive and functional component in the 
“modes” because modes’ stiffness depends on a state of cognitive fusion between 
patients and their active “modes” (Arntz and van Genderen 2009). There is therefore 
a top–down aspect, however, immediately denied by ST’s therapeutic style, which is 
largely bottom–up, because in ST the therapeutic change is conceived as happening 
through an intense corrective emotional experience in which the painful events that 
underlie dysfunction are relived in a non-traumatic way (Young et al. 2003).
In the MIT model the emotional pain would depend on the metacognitive deficits 
in the skills to identify emotions, to interpret our own mental states, to distinguish 
them from those of others, and finally to behaviorally master them (Semerari et al. 
2007; Semerari et al. 2014). It is a complex multi-function that somehow includes 
either top–down or bottom–up processes. However, the therapy appears to prefer 
mainly bottom–up techniques of emotional and relational adjustment by encour-
aging the observation and appreciation of the most minute details of daily life and 
reality, in order to overcome the tendency to worry, ruminate and produce over-
interpretations (Dimaggio et al. 2015). After this experiential phase, MIT stimulates 
the development of higher metacognitive functions. The therapeutic relationship 
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is conceived as an in vivo opportunity to experience this type of complex thinking 
(DiMaggio et al. 2007). However, it is prescribed that the final step of the therapy 
would include the construction of more positive self-beliefs. Therefore, MIT retains 
some structural self-knowledge related concepts (Dimaggio et al. 2015).
In these protocols the bottom–up route is privileged. The prevailing idea is that 
the experiential intervention, mostly bodily and, in some cases, relational—always 
precedes any conscious emotional regulation, which comes only at a later time to lay 
down skills learned via the body in a new cognitive routine. Therapy is basically an 
emotional and relational experience where new regulative skills are never learned 
consciously by executive control (Liotti 2001).
Conclusion: Not an Affiliation Story, but Uneven Turning Points
The bottleneck-regulating function of either metacognitive processes or experiential 
interventions is a strong alternative to the structuralist self-psychology of the “sec-
ond wave” CBT approaches. It is not a direct development, according to a filiation 
storytelling that would naturally go from behaviorism to the cognitive revolution. 
In this paper we have tried to disconfirm the hypothesis in which every historical 
turning point is fully consistent with its historical roots planted in earlier times. We 
have shown that clinical models are not the mechanical application of the cognitive 
revolution to therapy, having cognitive therapies also received the waters of a psy-
chodynamic tributary (Rosner 2014a, b), and we have also shown that this tributary 
has helped to give a structuralist character of self-psychology to cognitive therapies. 
This structuralist character was already in sharp break with the functionalist nature 
of behaviorism.
In turn, also the process oriented turning point denies the structuralism of the 
self-schema theory which affected CBT approaches, either Beck’s CT or construc-
tivist. Process oriented models do not explain emotional disorders in terms of a hid-
den broken structure, the self, but to the incorrect use of a function: attention in 
top–down metacognitive models, emotional regulation in bottom–up experiential 
models. This functionalist conception brings process oriented models closer to some 
behaviorist concepts than to clinical cognitive schema theory, because they proposes 
a renaissance of “first wave” principles such as extinction reinterpreted from a meta-
cognitive viewpoint. Perhaps, a sort of mentalist and metacognitive variation of both 
Pavlov’s classical respondent conditioning (1927/1960) and Skinner’s operant con-
ditioning (1954).
The hypothesis of the behavioral root of the metacognitive model has a further 
confirmation. The metacognitive model, before being brought to maturity by Wells, 
had found its main precursor in Tom Borkovec’s studies about insomnia and then 
generalized anxiety disorder (Borkovec and Inz 1990; Borkovec et al. 1998). Borko-
vec explored insomnia and anxiety not in terms of cognitive beliefs, but in relation 
to functional processes, such as worry and brooding, in turn dependent on metacog-
nitive beliefs: “worry helps me coping and therefore I do it, even if it costs me sleep 
and peace of mind”. What matters was that Borkovec had a never repudiated behav-
iorist background. So he considered anxiety more like a behavior equipped with its 
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function that as an underlying cognitive structure. For this reason Borkovec ended 
up investigating worry as a behavior of the mind and a process, but not a belief 
(Borkovec 1994).
Of course, this does not mean that in classic cognitive models process oriented 
aspects where not represented or prefigured. As written above, when Beck described 
the role played by vicious circles of fear of fear (Beck et al. 1985) and when Albert 
Ellis conceived the influential concept of secondary ABC (DiGiuseppe et al. 2014, 
pp. 64–65) heralded functionalist metacognitive processes. Moreover, REBT’s func-
tionally maladaptive evaluations foreshadowed the functionalistic switch of the 
“third wave”.
In addition, there are also elements that make metacognitive and behaviorist 
models different from one another. Among them, the main difference appears to be 
the non contextualist setting of Wells’ metacognitive model. In fact, the metacogni-
tive model selects a bottleneck on which to surgically act to obtain the maximum 
therapeutic effect. Basically, this strategy is anti- contextualist, and makes the meta-
cognitive model very different from the more recent contextualist developments of 
behaviorism, like the ACT (Hayes 2004).
In conclusion, what really matters in the process oriented models and above all in 
metacognitive models is the innovative conception of cognitive function. No longer 
a holistic mediation, a sort of allmighty homunculus intermediate between trigger 
and response, but, as already highlighted, a metacognitive ‘retroactive’ executive 
control (Wells and Mathews 2015, p. 31) even when it is learnt in experiential bot-
tom–up interventions. This theoretical turning point allows to reformulate the clini-
cal cognitive theory in more promising terms and encourages clinicians and patients 
to increase the level of awareness and knowledge of how voluntary functions of cog-
nitive control and attentional selection of information really work. This can be trans-
lated into new effective strategies of retroactive detached and mindful management 
of suffering states in emotional disorders.
In addition, process oriented models also would allow to conceive in a new and 
different way the relationship between cognitive therapies and behaviorism, forc-
ing all of us to rethink both behaviorism and cognitivism in less simplistic terms. 
Behaviorism, although perhaps maintaining an insurmountable idiosyncrasy for 
mentalistic functions, cultivated within it the fruitful idea of functionalism and feed-
back control. Cognitivism still retains its revolutionary value not so much in the idea 
of cognitive mediation, but in the importance it gave to the function of executive 
control and voluntary mental representation.
However, it is perhaps true that the new models, and perhaps especially the 
metacognitive ones, sometimes can be tricky for the clinician who may not be 
very interested in the theoretical sophistication of debates about functionalism 
versus structuralism. Process therapies, although scientifically robust, may dam-
age the communications between theorists and clinicians and may decrease the 
intuitive clinical simplicity of “second wave” CBT approaches, including Beck’s 
CT. In addition, the clinician has a natural tendency to formulate the case in 
terms of a narrative of the self rather than in impersonal functions. In order to 
satisfy this need it will be beneficial to propose functionalist models compati-
ble with the narrative mindset of clinicians; models that would contain both the 
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developmental ground of the disorder, the narration of the painful experiences 
that transformed them in emotionally vulnerable individuals, and the mental pro-
cesses that patients have mistakenly cultivated deeming them functional or uncon-
trollable, on the ground of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs (Wells 2008).
Last but not least, despite all the innovations offered by process therapies, it 
must be stressed that from an evidence-based viewpoint Beck’s CT maintains the 
strongest and most solid effectiveness results for many emotional disorders in 
the area of depression, anxiety and eating disorders (Nathan and Gorman 2015). 
None of the new therapies have shown better results in the target area of CT, 
namely depression, anxiety and eating disorders, with the exception of MCT 
which in a recent meta-analysis resulted significantly more effective than both 
waitlist control groups as well as CBT (Normann et al. 2014). On the other hand, 
it is true that the available evidence now allows considering all third wave treat-
ments as empirically supported as well as CT in some areas—for example, EMDR 
is as effective as CT for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder—and even superior in 
other cases, namely DBT for personality disorders (Kahl et al. 2012). Moreover, 
the reflection about the emergence of process oriented and functionalist mod-
els may provide suggestions about the old question that all these therapies have 
some empirical support. As known, the common answer up until now has been 
the common factors, a theory that proposes that different approaches in psycho-
therapy share common factors that account for much of the effectiveness. Among 
these common factors, therapeutic relationship factors are frequently emphasized 
(Wampold and Imel 2015). Of course, such an explanation would question the 
empirical data -based on randomized placebo-controlled trials- in favor of the 
greater efficacy of CBT approaches for some disorders, mainly anxiety-related 
disorders. On the other hand, an alternative explanation which would identify the 
common factor that accounts for their effectiveness in the process oriented meta-
cognitive focus would also preserve room for the specificity of CBT approaches 
for some disorders (Smits and Hofman 2008), specificity moreover recently con-
firmed in an updated meta-analysis (Carpenter et al. 2018).
In conclusion, although the new wave of process oriented and experiential thera-
pies is promising, scientific literature confirms that, at the present time, CT is still 
the most effective psychotherapy for most emotional disorders (Nathan and Gor-
man 2015). However, it is possible to imagine possible future directions of devel-
opment and their empirical and theoretical strengths and weaknesses using the top 
down/bottom up classification.
The top down orientation has its empirical strength in some promising meta-analy-
ses that suggest an increase in psychotherapeutic effectiveness for some emotional dis-
orders when compared to Beck’s CT, the “golden standard” (Normann et  al. 2014). 
They would therefore be a step forward. The theoretical strength is that attention, the 
target variable of the metacognitive model, is rigorously operationalizable both in its 
mechanisms of action and in its effects, ensuring empirical consistency both to the the-
oretical elaboration and to the verification procedures (Mathews and Wells 2004). It is 
scientific reductionism at its best. On the other hand, this reductionism can be criticized 
for theoretical and clinical narrowness. To summarize, this direction seems the most 
responsive for the purpose of strategically identifying the variables most sensitive to 
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therapeutic action. However, it risks being excluded from broader and less immediately 
fruitful reflections.
At the other end of the axis we find the models that prefer a bottom up orientation. 
The empirical strength of these models is their promising data for the traumatic clinical 
area (Lancaster et al. 2016). From a theoretical point of view, these models are based 
on the fascinating models of embodied cognition (Shapiro 2010). These ambitious 
models attempt to bridge the mind–body gap and show all the pros and cons of their 
ambition: on the one hand the audacity of a non-reductionist idea of the functioning 
of the human system, on the other the risk of investigating models that are not easily 
operationalizable.
From the clinical point of view, bottom up interventions could, in turn, be classified 
into two large groups. The first group includes therapies that use experiential and imag-
inative interventions that presuppose an explicit agreement with the patient, a sharing 
of the rationale and an explicit therapeutic alliance. The second group uses interper-
sonal interventions that precede the explicit alliance and that are focused on states of 
crisis in the therapeutic relationship that would be unique therapeutic opportunities.
Actually, the two directions are strictly interwoven with each other. The first group 
of bottom up interventions implies a top down component, which is the sharing of the 
rational intervention and its deliberate and voluntary execution; moreover, it could also 
be added, a top down intervention like a Beckian questioning is also an experience and 
therefore presents a bottom–up aspect. The second group, on the other hand, presents 
itself as a non-schedulable corrective emotional experience in the here and now of the 
therapeutic relationship and seems not directly compatible with a significant top down 
action, at least at the beginning of its implementation. This is perhaps the case of the 
model of Safran and Muran (2000) focused on detecting alliance ruptures and rupture 
repairs in session, in which the only top down moment is locked up in the retrospective 
reconstruction of these critical events. It should be emphasized that cognitive-behavio-
ral therapies have never excluded imaginative and experiential intervention (suffice to 
mention the interest of Albert Ellis in guided imagery or the use of behavioral exposi-
tion in the model of Aaron Beck) but they have always inserted these interventions in 
the frame of the shared formulation of the case and of the rationale of the intervention. 
In short, it would seem that the development of cognitive behavioral therapies goes 
more towards the aware (and therefore top down) clinical management of the processes 
in therapy and this top down management can include in its rationale bottom up experi-
ential and imaginative processes.
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